The Mirage of Unity: An Essay on Pacific Ocean Diplomacy in the BBNJ Era
By Mae Bruton-Adams
The recent Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), which took place in Palau in early April 2025, was a portrayal of Pacific unity. The Pacific gathered in one place an illustration of unity to strengthen a chorded voice calling for ocean equity, robust area-based management tools, and meaningful benefit-sharing mechanisms. Speeches, photo ops, and official statements reinforced the narrative of solidarity, underscoring the "Blue Pacific Continent" as a single, powerful bloc.
But this dome of harmony deserves a closer appraisal. In practice, Pacific countries are far from aligned in how they engage with the high seas, particularly on critical issues such as deep-sea mining (DSM), marine spatial planning (MSP), and the operationalization of access and benefit-sharing (ABS). Instead, what is presented as solidarity may reflect a more complex and fragmented reality.
Strategic Divergence Beneath the Surface
Examine the positions on DSM for a moment. While Palau, Fiji, Tuvalu, and the Federated States of Micronesia have called for a moratorium on seabed mining, countries such as Nauru and the Cook Islands have proceeded with exploration and partnerships geared toward extraction. Kiribati and Tonga maintain an equivocal stance, signaling interest while remaining non-committal. This spectrum—from prohibition to promotion—raises questions about the coherence of the region’s collective advocacy.
Similarly, the BBNJ treaty engagement tells a similar story. Only eight of the 15 Pacific countries recognized by the UN have signed the agreement so far. If unity is defined by common action, then the numbers suggest a tension between rhetorical alignment and policy divergence.
Only one-third of the Pacific countries have adopted EEZ-scale MSP frameworks or national ocean policies on marine spatial planning. Others have limited local MPAs or fragmented efforts without legal enforcement. Similarly, in access and benefit-sharing (ABS), though most have ratified the Nagoya Protocol, only Palau has a comprehensive legal regime to ensure royalties, knowledge transfer, or protection of intellectual property rights.
The Function of Rhetorical Unity
This fragmentation may be purposeful rather than evidence of institutional weakness. Rhetorical unity in spaces like BBNJ grants Pacific countries moral leverage and collective bargaining power, even as individual countries maintain diplomatic and economic flexibility. It allows them to frame themselves as defenders of the global ocean while reserving space to negotiate as sovereign actors with varying national interests.
Palau is a notable case. It has championed ocean protection, closing 80% of its EEZ to commercial fishing. Yet, it continues to deepen strategic military ties with the United States, raising questions about how these dual commitments interact. FSM has introduced an MSP bill to Congress, but it neither includes spatial designations nor retains enforcement mechanisms. This absence of clear implementation creates a kind of internal paralysis – caught between ambition and inaction – while externally, it generates confusion over where the country truly stands. Meanwhile, FSM’s leadership has confirmed a $2 billion agreement with the United States for a major military buildup in Yap, underscoring how declarations of environmental leadership may coexist with and potentially be shaped by strategic security alignments.
Others follow similar paths. The Cook Islands engages in regional climate summits while fostering seabed mining partnerships. RMI maintains a vocal presence in environmental governance spaces but remains home to a major U.S. military installation in Kwajalein. These examples are not necessarily contradictions – they invite inquiry into whether such positions reflect broader tactical calculations or simply the realities of constrained choices in a geopolitically crowded space.
Fragmentation as Strategy
The Pacific is increasingly becoming one of the most militarized ocean regions in the world. While much attention has focused on U.S. defense engagements in the North Pacific, similar strategic dynamics are emerging in the South. Australia’s Pacific Maritime Security Program delivers naval vessels and aerial surveillance to countries such as Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. New Zealand funds security and border monitoring capacities across Polynesia. China has expanded port infrastructure and security cooperation, most controversially through its security agreement with the Solomon Islands.
These developments raise complex questions. How might environmental autonomy be constrained as militaries entrench themselves across the region? Will countries with rising military footprints face subtle (or overt) pressures in how they zone their marine protected areas, enforce Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU) restrictions, or design ocean governance frameworks? And more provocatively - will the militarization of the Pacific lead us to a future where states are prepared to go to war over fishing violations or over disputed MPA boundaries? The theater of conservation may increasingly resemble a battlefield of strategic control.
What emerges may not be disunity in failure but a kind of strategic fragmentation. These countries are not naïve moral actors – they are adaptive microstates navigating global regimes with care. They speak with one voice when the platform calls for visibility and collective influence. Yet they maintain divergence in law, policy, and action to hedge risk, secure bilateral partnerships, and negotiate across multiple fronts.
This is not hypocrisy – it may be diplomatic agility. In a world where small states are often structurally disadvantaged, Pacific countries may be carving out maneuvering space by leveraging unity while engaging in pragmatic pluralism.
The Palau-hosted BBNJ meeting offers a moment to listen closely to the Pacific voice. But behind declarations of unity lies a dynamic choreography of diplomacy and adaptation. Recognizing this tension is not a critique but an invitation to think more deeply about how small states shape their futures within fragmented and overlapping governance landscapes.
To respect Pacific leadership in ocean diplomacy is to move beyond slogans and understand the nuanced, evolving strategies that underpin them.
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